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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This is a report about the use and misuse of ci-
tation data in the assessment of scientific research.
The idea that research assessment must be done us-
ing “simple and objective” methods is increasingly
prevalent today. The “simple and objective” meth-
ods are broadly interpreted as bibliometrics, that is,
citation data and the statistics derived from them.
There is a belief that citation statistics are inher-
ently more accurate because they substitute simple
numbers for complex judgments, and hence over-
come the possible subjectivity of peer review. But
this belief is unfounded.
• Relying on statistics is not more accurate when
the statistics are improperly used. Indeed, statis-
tics can mislead when they are misapplied or mis-
understood. Much of modern bibliometrics seems
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to rely on experience and intuition about the in-
terpretation and validity of citation statistics.
• While numbers appear to be “objective,” their ob-
jectivity can be illusory. The meaning of a citation
can be even more subjective than peer review. Be-
cause this subjectivity is less obvious for citations,
those who use citation data are less likely to un-
derstand their limitations.
• The sole reliance on citation data provides at best
an incomplete and often shallow understanding
of research—an understanding that is valid only
when reinforced by other judgments. Numbers are
not inherently superior to sound judgments.
Using citation data to assess research ultimately
means using citation-based statistics to rank things—
journals, papers, people, programs, and disciplines.
The statistical tools used to rank these things are
often misunderstood and misused.
• For journals, the impact factor is most often used
for ranking. This is a simple average derived from
the distribution of citations for a collection of ar-
ticles in the journal. The average captures only a
small amount of information about that distribu-
tion, and it is a rather crude statistic. In addition,
there are many confounding factors when judging
journals by citations, and any comparison of jour-
nals requires caution when using impact factors.
Using the impact factor alone to judge a journal is
like using weight alone to judge a person’s health.
• For papers, instead of relying on the actual count
of citations to compare individual papers, peo-
ple frequently substitute the impact factor of the
journals in which the papers appear. They believe
that higher impact factors must mean higher ci-
tation counts. But this is often not the case! This
is a pervasive misuse of statistics that needs to be
challenged whenever and wherever it occurs.
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• For individual scientists, complete citation records
can be difficult to compare. As a consequence,
there have been attempts to find simple statistics
that capture the full complexity of a scientist’s
citation record with a single number. The most
notable of these is the h-index, which seems to be
gaining in popularity. But even a casual inspec-
tion of the h-index and its variants shows that
these are na¨ıve attempts to understand compli-
cated citation records. While they capture a small
amount of information about the distribution of a
scientist’s citations, they lose crucial information
that is essential for the assessment of research.
The validity of statistics such as the impact factor
and h-index is neither well understood nor well stud-
ied. The connection of these statistics with research
quality is sometimes established on the basis of “ex-
perience.” The justification for relying on them is
that they are “readily available.” The few studies
of these statistics that were done focused narrowly
on showing a correlation with some other measure
of quality rather than on determining how one can
best derive useful information from citation data.
We do not dismiss citation statistics as a tool for
assessing the quality of research—citation data and
statistics can provide some valuable information. We
recognize that assessment must be practical, and for
this reason easily derived citation statistics almost
surely will be part of the process. But citation data
provide only a limited and incomplete view of re-
search quality, and the statistics derived from ci-
tation data are sometimes poorly understood and
misused. Research is too important to measure its
value with only a single coarse tool.
We hope those involved in assessment will read
both the commentary and the details of this report
in order to understand not only the limitations of
citation statistics but also how better to use them.
If we set high standards for the conduct of science,
surely we should set equally high standards for as-
sessing its quality.
From the committee charge
The drive towards more transparency and ac-
countability in the academic world has created
a “culture of numbers” in which institutions
and individuals believe that fair decisions can
be reached by algorithmic evaluation of some
statistical data; unable to measure quality (the
ultimate goal), decision-makers replace quality
by numbers that they can measure. This trend
calls for comment from those who profession-
ally “deal with numbers”—mathematicians
and statisticians.
INTRODUCTION
Scientific research is important. Research under-
lies much progress in our modern world and provides
hope that we can solve some of the seemingly in-
tractable problems facing humankind, from the en-
vironment to our expanding population. Because of
this, governments and institutions around the world
provide considerable financial support for scientific
research. Naturally, they want to know their money
is being invested wisely; they want to assess the
quality of the research for which they pay in order to
make informed decisions about future investments.
This much isn’t new: People have been assess-
ing research for many years. What is new, however,
is the notion that good assessment must be “sim-
ple and objective,” and that this can be achieved
by relying primarily on metrics (statistics) derived
from citation data rather than a variety of methods,
including judgments by scientists themselves. The
opening paragraph from a recent report states this
view starkly:
It is the Government’s intention that the
current method for determining the qual-
ity of university research—the UK Research
Assessment Exercise (RAE)—should be re-
placed after the next cycle is completed
in 2008. Metrics, rather than peer-review,
will be the focus of the new system and it
is expected that bibliometrics (using counts
of journal articles and their citations) will
be a central quality index in this system
(Evidence Report, 2007, page 3).
Those who argue for this simple objectivity be-
lieve that research is too important to rely on sub-
jective judgments. They believe citation-based met-
rics bring clarity to the ranking process and elimi-
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nate ambiguities inherent in other forms of assess-
ment. They believe that carefully chosen metrics
are independent and free of bias. Most of all, they
believe such metrics allow us to compare all parts
of the research enterprise—journals, papers, people,
programs and even entire disciplines—simply and ef-
fectively, without the use of subjective peer review.
But this faith in the accuracy, independence and
efficacy of metrics is misplaced.
• First, the accuracy of these metrics is illusory. It
is a common maxim that statistics can lie when
they are improperly used. The misuse of citation
statistics is widespread and egregious. In spite of
repeated attempts to warn against such misuse
(e.g., the misuse of the impact factor), govern-
ments, institutions, and even scientists themselves
continue to draw unwarranted or even false con-
clusions from the misapplication of citation statis-
tics.
• Second, sole reliance on citation-based metrics re-
places one kind of judgment with another. Instead
of subjective peer review one has the subjective
interpretation of a citation’s meaning. Those who
promote exclusive reliance on citation-based met-
rics implicitly assume that each citation means
the same thing about the cited research—its “im-
pact.” This is an assumption that is unproven and
quite likely incorrect.
• Third, while statistics are valuable for understand-
ing the world in which we live, they provide only
a partial understanding. In our modern world, it
is sometimes fashionable to assert a mystical be-
lief that numerical measurements are superior to
other forms of understanding. Those who promote
the use of citation statistics as a replacement for
a fuller understanding of research implicitly hold
such a belief. We not only need to use statistics
correctly—we need to use them wisely as well.
We do not argue with the effort to evaluate re-
search but rather with the demand that such eval-
uations rely predominantly on “simple and objec-
tive” citation-based metrics—a demand that often
is interpreted as requiring easy-to-calculate numbers
that rank publications or people or programs. Re-
search usually has multiple goals, both short-term
and long, and it is therefore reasonable that its value
must be judged by multiple criteria. Mathemati-
cians know that there are many things, both real
and abstract, that cannot be simply ordered, in the
sense that each two can be compared. Comparison
often requires a more complicated analysis, which
sometimes leaves one undecided about which of two
things is “better.” The correct answer to “Which is
better?” is sometimes: “It depends!”
The plea to use multiple methods to assess the
quality of research has been made before (e.g. Mar-
tin, 1996 or Carey, Cowling and Taylor, 2007). Pub-
lications can be judged in many ways, not only by
citations. Measures of esteem such as invitations,
membership on editorial boards, and awards often
measure quality. In some disciplines and in some
countries, grant funding can play a role. And peer
review—the judgment of fellow scientists—is an im-
portant component of assessment. (We should not
discard peer review merely because it is sometimes
flawed by bias, any more than we should discard ci-
tation statistics because they are sometimes flawed
by misuse.) This is a small sample of the multiple
ways in which assessment can be done. There are
many avenues to good assessment, and their relative
importance varies among disciplines. In spite of this,
“objective” citation-based statistics repeatedly be-
come the preferred method for assessment. The lure
of a simple process and simple numbers (preferably
a single number) seems to overcome common sense
and good judgment.
Research usually has multiple goals and it is
therefore reasonable that its value must be judged
by multiple criteria.
This report is written by mathematical scientists
to address the misuse of statistics in assessing sci-
entific research. Of course, this misuse is sometimes
directed towards the discipline of mathematics it-
self, and that is one of the reasons for writing this
report. The special citation culture of mathematics,
with low citation counts for journals, papers, and
authors, makes it especially vulnerable to the abuse
of citation statistics. We believe, however, that all
scientists, as well as the general public, should be
anxious to use sound scientific methods when as-
sessing research.
Some in the scientific community would dispense
with citation statistics altogether in a cynical re-
action to past abuse, but doing so would mean dis-
carding a valuable tool. Citation-based statistics can
play a role in the assessment of research, provided
they are used properly, interpreted with caution,
and make up only part of the process. Citations pro-
vide information about journals, papers, and people.
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We don’t want to hide that information; we want to
illuminate it.
That is the purpose of this report. The first three
sections address the ways in which citation data can
be used (and misused) to evaluate journals, papers,
and people. The next section discusses the varied
meanings of citations and the consequent limita-
tions on citation-based statistics. The last section
counsels about the wise use of statistics and urges
that assessments temper the use of citation statistics
with other judgments, even though it makes assess-
ments less simple.
“Everything should be made as simple as possible,
but not simpler,” Albert Einstein once said.1 This
advice from one of the world’s preeminent scientists
is especially apt when assessing scientific research.
RANKING JOURNALS: THE IMPACT
FACTOR2
The impact factor was created in the 1960s as a
way to measure the value of journals by calculating
the average number of citations per article over a
specific period of time (Garfield, 2005). The average
is computed from data gathered by Thomson Sci-
entific (previously called the Institute for Scientific
Information), which publishes Journal Citation Re-
ports (THOMSON: JOURNAL CITATION REPORTS).
Thomson Scientific extracts references from more
than 9000 journals, adding information about each
article and its references to its database each year
(THOMSON: SELECTION). Using that information,
one can count how often a particular article is cited
1This quote was attributed to Einstein in the Reader’s Di-
gest. Oct. 1977. It appears to be derived from his actual quote:
“It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all the-
ory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as
few as possible without having to surrender the adequate rep-
resentation of a single datum of experience.” From “On the
Method of Theoretical Physics” The Herbert Spencer Lec-
ture, delivered at Oxford (10 June 1933); also published in
Philosophy of Science 1 163–169.
2While we concentrate on the Thomson Scientific impact
factor in this section, we note that Thomson promotes the
use of two other statistics. Also, similar statistics based on
average citation counts for journals can be derived from other
databases, including Scopus, Spires, Google Scholar and (for
mathematics) the Math Reviews citation database. The latter
consists of citations from over 400 mathematics journals from
the period 2000–present, identified as items that were listed
in Math Reviews since 1940; it includes more than 3 million
citations.
by subsequent articles that are published in the col-
lection of indexed journals. (We note that Thom-
son Scientific indexes less than half the mathematics
journals covered by Mathematical Reviews and Zen-
tralblatt, the two major reviewing journals in math-
ematics.3)
For a particular journal and year, the journal im-
pact factor is computed by calculating the average
number of citations to articles in the journal during
the preceding two years from all articles published
in that given year (in the particular collection of
journals indexed by Thomson Scientific). If the im-
pact factor of a journal is 1.5 in 2007, it means that
on average articles published during 2005 and 2006
were cited 1.5 times by articles in the collection of
all indexed journals published in 2007.
Thomson Scientific itself uses the impact factor
as one factor in selecting which journals to index
(THOMSON: SELECTION). On the other hand,
Thomson promotes the use of the impact factor more
generally to compare journals.
“As a tool for management of library jour-
nal collections, the impact factor supplies
the library administrator with informa-
tion about journals already in the collec-
tion and journals under consideration for
acquisition. These data must also be com-
bined with cost and circulation data to
make rational decisions about purchases
of journals” (THOMSON: IMPACT FACTOR).
Many writers have pointed out that one should
not judge the academic worth of a journal using cita-
tion data alone, and the present authors very much
agree. In addition to this general observation, the
impact factor has been criticized for other reasons
as well. (See Seglen, 1997; Amin and Mabe, 2000;
3Thomson Scientific indicates (March 2008) that it indexes
journals in the following categories:
MATHEMATICS (217),
MATHEMATICS APPLIED (177),
MATHEMATICS INTERDISCIPLINARY (76),
PHYSICS, MATHEMATICAL (44),
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS (96).
The categories overlap, and the total number of journals
is approximately 400. By contrast, Mathematical Reviews in-
cludes items from well more than 1200 journals each year,
and considers more than 800 journals as “core” (in the sense
that every item in the journal is included in Math Reviews).
Zentralblatt covers a similar number of mathematics journals.
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Monastersky, 2005; Ewing, 2006; Adler, 2007 and
Hall, 2007.)
(i) The identification of the impact factor as an
average is not quite correct. Because many journals
publish non-substantive items such as letters or ed-
itorials, which are seldom cited, these items are not
counted in the denominator of the impact factor.
On the other hand, while infrequent, these items are
sometimes cited, and these citations are counted in
the numerator. The impact factor is therefore not
quite the average citations per article. When jour-
nals publish a large number of such “non-substantial”
items, this deviation can be significant. In many ar-
eas, including mathematics, this deviation is mini-
mal.
(ii) The two-year period used in defining the im-
pact factor was intended to make the statistic cur-
rent (Garfield, 2005). For some fields, such as bio-
medical sciences, this is appropriate because most
published articles receive most of their citations soon
after publication. In other fields, such as mathemat-
ics, most citations occur beyond the two-year pe-
riod. Examining a collection of more than 3 million
recent citations in mathematics journals (the Math
Reviews Citation database) one sees that roughly
90% of citations to a journal fall outside this 2-year
window. Consequently, the impact factor is based on
a mere 10% of the citation activity and misses the
vast majority of citations.4
Does the two-year interval mean the impact fac-
tor is misleading? For mathematics journals the evi-
dence is equivocal. Thomson Scientific computes 5-
year impact factors, which it points out correlate
well with the usual (2-year) impact factors (Garfield,
1998). Using the Math Reviews citation database,
one can compute “impact factors” (i.e., average ci-
tations per article) for a collection of the 100 most
cited mathematics journals using periods of 2, 5 and
10 years. The chart below shows that 5- and 10-year
4The Mathematical Reviews citation database includes
(March 2008) more than 3 million references in approximately
400 journals published from 2000 to the present. The refer-
ences are matched to items in the MR database and extend
over many decades. Unlike the Science Citation Index, cita-
tions both to books and journals are included. It is a curious
fact that roughly 50% of the citations are to items appear-
ing in the previous decade; 25% cite articles appearing in the
decade before that; 12.5% cite articles in the prior decade;
and so on. This sort of behavior is special to each discipline,
of course.
impact factors generally track the 2-year impact fac-
tor.
The one large outlier is a journal that did not
publish papers during part of this time; the smaller
outliers tend to be journals that publish a relatively
small number of papers each year, and the chart
merely reflects the normal variability in impact fac-
tors for such journals. It is apparent that chang-
ing the number of “target years” when calculating
the impact factor changes the ranking of journals,
but the changes are generally modest, except for
small journals, where impact factors also vary when
changing the “source year” (see below).
(iii) The impact factor varies considerably among
disciplines (Amin and Mabe, 2000). Part of this dif-
ference stems from the observation (ii): If in some
disciplines many citations occur outside the two-
year window, impact factors for journals will be far
lower. On the other hand, part of the difference is
simply that the citation cultures differ from disci-
pline to discipline, and scientists will cite papers at
different rates and for different reasons. (We elabo-
rate on this observation later because the meaning of
citations is extremely important.) It follows that one
cannot in any meaningful way compare two journals
in different disciplines using impact factors.
(iv) The impact factor can vary considerably from
year to year, and the variation tends to be larger for
smaller journals (Amin and Mabe, 2000). For jour-
nals publishing fewer than 50 articles, for example,
the average change in the impact factor from 2002
to 2003 was nearly 50%. This is wholly expected, of
course, because the sample size for small journals is
small. On the other hand, one often compares jour-
nals for a fixed year, without taking into account the
higher variation for small journals.
(v) Journals that publish articles in languages
other than English will likely receive fewer citations
because a large portion of the scientific community
cannot (or do not) read them. And the type of jour-
nal, rather than the quality alone, may influence
the impact factor. Journals that publish review ar-
ticles, for example, will often receive far more cita-
tions than journals that do not, and therefore have
higher (sometimes, substantially higher) impact fac-
tors (Amin and Mabe, 2000).
(vi) The most important criticism of the impact
factor is that its meaning is not well understood.
When using the impact factor to compare two jour-
nals, there is no a priori model that defines what
it means to be “better.” The only model derives
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Fig. 1. The age of citations from articles published in 2003 covering four different fields. Citations to articles published
in 2001–2002 are those contributing to the impact factor; all other citations are irrelevant to the impact factor. Data from
Thomson Scientific.
Fig. 2. “Impact factors” for 2, 5 and 10 years for 100 mathematics journals. Data from Math Reviews citation database.
from the impact factor itself—a larger impact fac-
tor means a better journal. In the classical statisti-
cal paradigm, one defines a model, formulates a hy-
pothesis (of no difference), and then finds a statistic,
which depending on its values allows one to accept
or reject the hypothesis. Deriving information (and
possibly a model) from the data itself is a legitimate
Fig. 3. Average citations per article for different disciplines,
showing that citation practices differ markedly. Data from
Thomson Scientific (Amin and Mabe, 2000).
approach to statistical analysis, but in this case it is
not clear what information has been derived. How
does the impact factor measure quality? Is it the
best statistic to measure quality? What precisely
does it measure? (Our later discussion about the
meaning of citations is relevant here.) Remarkably
little is known about a model for journal quality or
how it might relate to the impact factor.
The above six criticisms of the impact factor are
all valid, but they mean only that the impact factor
is crude, not useless. For example, the impact factor
can be used as a starting point in ranking journals in
groups by using impact factors initially to define the
groups and then employing other criteria to refine
the ranking and verify that the groups make sense.
But using the impact factor to evaluate journals re-
quires caution. The impact factor cannot be used
to compare journals across disciplines, for example,
and one must look closely at the type of journals
when using the impact factor to rank them. One
should also pay close attention to annual variations,
especially for smaller journals, and understand that
small differences may be purely random phenomena.
And it is important to recognize that the impact
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factor may not accurately reflect the full range of
citation activity in some disciplines, both because
not all journals are indexed and because the time
period is too short. Other statistics based on longer
periods of time and more journals may be better
indicators of quality. Finally, citations are only one
way to judge journals, and should be supplemented
with other information (the central message of this
report).
These are all cautions similar to those one would
make for any ranking based on statistics. Mindlessly
ranking journals according to impact factors for a
particular year is a misuse of statistics. To its credit,
Thomson Scientific agrees with this statement and
(gently) cautions those who use the impact factor
about these things.
“Thomson Scientific does not depend
on the impact factor alone in assessing
the usefulness of a journal, and neither
should anyone else. The impact factor
should not be used without careful
attention to the many phenomena that in-
fluence citation rates, as for example the
average number of references cited in the
average article. The impact factor should
be used with informed peer review”
(THOMSON: IMPACT FACTOR).
Unfortunately, this advice is too often ignored.
RANKING PAPERS
The impact factor and similar citation-based statis-
tics can be misused when ranking journals, but there
is a more fundamental and more insidious misuse:
Using the impact factor to compare individual pa-
pers, people, programs, or even disciplines. This is a
growing problem that extends across many nations
and many disciplines, made worse by recent national
research assessments.
In a sense, this is not a new phenomenon. Scien-
tists are often called upon to make judgments about
publication records, and one hears comments such
as, “She publishes in good journals” or “Most of his
papers are in low level journals.” These can be sen-
sible assessments: The quality of journals in which a
scientist generally (or consistently) publishes is one
of many factors one can use to assess the scientist’s
overall research. The impact factor, however, has in-
creased the tendency to ascribe the properties of an
individual journal to each article within that journal
(and to each author).
Thomson Scientific implicitly promotes this prac-
tice:
“Perhaps the most important and recent
use of impact is in the process of aca-
demic evaluation. The impact factor
can be used to provide a gross approxi-
mation of the prestige of journals in which
individuals have been published”
(THOMSON: IMPACT FACTOR).
Here are some examples of the ways in which peo-
ple have interpreted this advice, reported from math-
ematicians around the world:
Example 1. My university has recently intro-
duced a new classification of journals using the Sci-
ence Citation Index Core journals. The journals are
divided into three groups based only on the impact
factor. There are 30 journals in the top list, contain-
ing no mathematics journal. The second list contains
667, which includes 21 mathematics journals. Pub-
lication in the first list causes university support of
research to triple; publication in the second list, to
double. Publication in the core list awards 15 points;
publication in any Thomson Scientific covered jour-
nal awards 10. Promotion requires a fixed minimum
number of points.
Example 2. In my country, university faculty
with permanent positions are evaluated every six
years. Sequential successful evaluations are the key
to all academic success. In addition to a curriculum
vitae, the largest factor in evaluation concerns rank-
ing five published papers. In recent years, these are
given 3 points if they appear in journals in the top
third of the Thomson Scientific list, 2 points if in
the second third, and 1 point in the bottom third.
(The three lists are created using the impact factor.)
Example 3. In our department, each faculty mem-
ber is evaluated by a formula involving the number
of single-author-equivalent papers, multiplied by the
impact factor of the journals in which they appear.
Promotions and hiring are based partly on this for-
mula.
In these examples, as well as many others reported
to us, the impact factor is being used either explic-
itly or implicitly to compare individual papers along
with their authors: If the impact factor of journal A
is greater than that of journal B, then surely a paper
in A must be superior to a paper in B, and author
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Fig. 4. Citation distribution for papers in Proceedings of the
American Mathematical Society, 2000–2004.
Fig. 5. Citation distribution for papers in the Transactions
of the American Mathematical Society, 2000–2004.
A superior to author B. In some cases, this reason-
ing is extended to rank departments or even entire
disciplines.
It has long been known that the distribution of
citation counts for individual papers in a journal
is highly skewed, approximating a so-called power
law (Seglen, 1997; Garfield, 1987). This has conse-
quences that can be made precise with an example.
The distribution for papers in the Proceedings of
the American Mathematical Society over the period
2000–2004 can be seen below. The Proceedings pub-
lishes short papers, normally shorter than ten pages
in length. During this period, it published 2381 pa-
pers (about 15,000 pages). Using 2005 journals in
the Math Reviews citation database, the average ci-
tation count per article (that is, the impact factor)
is 0.434.
The Transactions of the AMS publishes longer
articles that are usually more substantial, both in
scope and content. Over the same period of time,
the Transactions published 1165 papers (more than
25,000 pages), with citation counts ranging from 0
to 12. The average number of citations per article
was 0.846—about twice that of the Proceedings.
Now consider two mathematicians, one publishing
a paper in the Proceedings and the other a paper
in the Transactions. Using some of the institutional
practices cited above, the second would be judged
superior to the first, publishing a paper in a journal
with higher impact factor—in fact, twice as high! Is
this a valid assessment? Are papers in the Trans-
action of the AMS twice as good as those in the
Proceedings?
When we assert that an individual Transactions
paper is better (in the sense of citations) than an
individual Proceedings paper, we need to ask not
a question about averages, but rather a question
about probabilities: What is the probability that we
are wrong? What is the probability that a randomly
selected Proceedings paper has at least as many ci-
tations as a randomly selected Transactions paper?
This is an elementary calculation, and the an-
swer is 62%. This means that we are wrong 62%
of the time, and a randomly selected Proceedings
paper will be just as good as (or better than) a ran-
domly selected Transactions paper—in spite of the
fact that the Proceedings impact factor is only half
that of the Transactions! We are more often wrong
than right. Most people find this surprising, but it
is a consequence of the highly skewed distribution
and the narrow window of time used to compute
the impact factor (which is the reason for the high
percentage of uncited papers).5 It shows the value
of precise statistical thinking rather than intuitive
observation.
This is typical behavior for journals, and there is
nothing special about the choices of these two jour-
nals. (For example, the Journal of the AMS over the
same period has an impact factor 2.63—six times
5The skewed distribution combined with the narrow win-
dow (using only one year’s journals as the source of citations
and five years as the target) means that a large number of
articles have either none or very few citations. This makes
it intuitively obvious that randomly chosen articles are often
equivalent.
The fact that many articles have no citations (or only
a few) is also a consequence of the long citation time for
mathematics—articles often take many years to accumulate
citations. If we choose longer periods of time for both source
journals and target years, then the citation counts increase
substantially and it becomes easier to distinguish journals by
citation behavior. This is the approach used in (Stringer et
al., 2008) to analyze citations. They show that for sufficiently
long periods of time, the distribution of citation counts for
individual articles appears to be log-normal. This provides
a mechanism for comparing two journals by comparing the
distributions, and is certainly more sophisticated than using
impact factors. Again, however, it considers only citations and
nothing else.
CITATION STATISTICS 9
that of the Proceedings. Yet a randomly selected
Proceedings article is at least as good as a Journal
article, in the sense of citations, 32% of the time.)
Thus, while it is incorrect to say that the impact
factor gives no information about individual papers
in a journal, the information is surprisingly vague
and can be dramatically misleading.
It follows that the kinds of calculations performed
in the three examples above—using the impact fac-
tor as a proxy for actual citation counts for individ-
ual papers—have little rational basis. Making asser-
tions that are incorrect more than half the time (or
a third of the time) is surely not a good way to carry
out an assessment.
Once one realizes that it makes no sense to substi-
tute the impact factor for individual article citation
counts, it follows that it makes no sense to use the
impact factor to evaluate the authors of those ar-
ticles, the programs in which they work, and (most
certainly) the disciplines they represent. The impact
factor and averages in general are too crude to make
sensible comparisons of this sort without more infor-
mation.
Of course, ranking people is not the same as rank-
ing their papers. But if you want to rank a person’s
papers using only citations to measure the quality of
a particular paper, you must begin by counting that
paper’s citations. The impact factor of the journal
in which the paper appears is not a reliable substi-
tute.
While it is incorrect to say that the impact factor
gives no information about individual papers in a
journal, the information is surprisingly vague and
can be dramatically misleading.
RANKING SCIENTISTS
While the impact factor has been the best known
citation-based statistic, there are other more recent
statistics that are now actively promoted. Here is
a small sample of three of these statistics meant to
rank individuals.
h-index : A scientist’s h-index is the largest n for
which he/she has published n articles, each with
at least n citations.
This is the most popular of the statistics men-
tioned here. It was proposed by J. E. Hirsch
(Hirsch, 2006) in order to measure “the scientific
output of a researcher” by focusing on the high-
end “tail” of a person’s citation distribution. The
goal was to substitute a single number for pub-
lications counts and citation distributions.
m-index : A scientist’s m-index is the h-index di-
vided by the number of years since his/her first
paper.
This was also proposed by Hirsch in the paper
above. The intention is to compensate junior sci-
entists because they have not had time to publish
papers or gain many citations.
g-index : A scientist’s g-index is the largest n for
which the n most cited papers have a total of
at least n2 citations.
This was proposed by Leo Egghe in 2006
(Egghe, 2006). The h-index does not take into
account the fact that some papers in the top n
may have extraordinarily high citation counts.
The g-index is meant to compensate for this.
There are more indices—many more of them—
including variants of those above that take into ac-
count the age of papers or the number of authors
(Batista et al., 2005; Batista, Campiteli and Ki-
nouchi, 2006; Sidiropouls, Katsaros and Manolopou-
los, 2006).
In his paper defining the h-index, Hirsch wrote
that he proposed the h-index as “an easily com-
putable index, which gives an estimate of the impor-
tance, significance, and broad impact of a scientist’s
cumulative research contributions” (Hirsch, 2006).
He went on to add that “this index may provide
a useful yardstick to compare different individuals
competing for the same resource when an important
evaluation criterion is scientific achievement.”
Neither of these assertions is supported by con-
vincing evidence. To support his claim that the h-
index measures the importance and significance of a
scientist’s cumulative research, Hirsch analyzes the
h-index for a collection of Nobel Prize winners (and,
separately, members of the National Academy). He
demonstrates that people in these groups generally
have high h-indices. One can conclude that it is
likely a scientist has a high h-index given the sci-
entist is a Nobel Laureate. But without further in-
formation, we know very little about the likelihood
someone will become a Nobel Laureate or a mem-
ber of the National Academy, given that they have
a high h-index. That is the kind of information one
wants in order to establish the validity of the h-
index.
In his article, Hirsch also claims that one can use
the h-index to compare two scientists:
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“I argue that two individuals with similar
h are comparable in terms of their overall
scientific impact, even if their total num-
ber of papers or their total number of ci-
tations is very different. Conversely, that
between two individuals (of the same sci-
entific age) with similar number of total
papers or of total citation count and very
different h-value, the one with the higher
h is likely to be the more accomplished
scientist” (Hirsch, 2006).
These assertions appear to be refuted by common
sense. (Think of two scientists, each with 10 papers
with 10 citations, but one with an additional 90 pa-
pers with 9 citations each; or suppose one has ex-
actly 10 papers of 10 citations and the other exactly
10 papers of 100 each. Would anyone think them
equivalent?)6
Hirsch extols the virtues of the h-index by claim-
ing that “h is preferable to other single-number cri-
teria commonly used to evaluate scientific output
of a researcher. . . ” (Hirsch, 2006), but he neither
6To illustrate how much information one loses when using
only the h-index, here is a real-life example of a distinguished
mid-career mathematician who has published 84 research pa-
pers. The citation distribution looks like the following:
Notice that slightly under 20% of the publications have 15
or more citations. The distribution of actual citation counts
for these 15 papers is:
In Hirsch’s analysis, however, all this information is thrown
away. One only remembers that the h-index is 15, meaning
that the top 15 papers have 15 or more citations.
defines “preferable” nor explains why one wants to
find “single-number criteria.”
While there has been some criticism of this ap-
proach, there has been little serious analysis. Much
of the analysis consists of showing “convergent va-
lidity,” that is, the h-index correlates well with other
publication/citation metrics, such as the number of
published papers or the total number of citations.
This correlation is unremarkable, since all these vari-
ables are functions of the same basic phenomenon—
publications. In one notable paper about the h-index
(Lehmann, Jackson and Lautrup, 2006) the authors
carry out a more careful analysis and demonstrate
that the h-index (actually, the m-index) is not as
“good” as merely considering the mean number of
citations per paper. Even here, however, the authors
do not adequately define what the term “good” means.
When the classical statistical paradigm is applied
(Lehmann, Jackson and Lautrup, 2006), the h-index
proves to be less reliable than other measures.
A number of variants of the h-index have been
devised to compare the quality of researchers not
only within a discipline but across disciplines as well
(Batista, Campiteli and Kinouchi, 2006; Molinari
and Molinari, 2008). Others claim that the h-index
can be used to compare institutes and departments
(Kinney, 2007). These are often breathtakingly na¨ıve
attempts to capture a complex citation record with
a single number. Indeed, the primary advantage of
these new indices over simple histograms of citation
counts is that the indices discard almost all the de-
tail of citation records, and this makes it possible to
rank any two scientists. Even simple examples, how-
ever, show that the discarded information is needed
to understand a research record. Surely understand-
ing ought to be the goal when assessing research, not
merely ensuring that any two people are compara-
ble.
Understanding ought to be the goal when assess-
ing research, not merely ensuring that any two
people are comparable.
In some cases, national assessment bodies are gath-
ering the h-index or one of its variants as part of
their data. This is a misuse of the data. Unfortu-
nately, having a single number to rank each scien-
tist is a seductive notion—one that may spread more
broadly to a public that often misunderstands the
proper use of statistical reasoning in far simpler set-
tings.
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THE MEANING OF CITATIONS
Those who promote citation statistics as the pre-
dominant measure of research quality do not answer
the essential question: What do citations mean? They
gather large amounts of data about citation counts,
process the data in order to derive statistics, and
then assert the resulting assessment process is “ob-
jective.” Yet it is the interpretation of the statistics
that leads to assessment, and the interpretation re-
lies on the meaning of citations, which is quite sub-
jective.
In the literature promoting this approach, it is
surprisingly difficult to find clear statements about
the meaning of citations.
“The concept behind citation indexing is
fundamentally simple. By recognizing that
the value of information is determined by
those who use it, what better way to mea-
sure the quality of the work than by mea-
suring the impact it makes on the commu-
nity at large. The widest possible popula-
tion within the scholarly community (i.e.
anyone who uses or cites the source ma-
terial) determines the influence or impact
of the idea and its originator on our body
of knowledge” (THOMSON: HISTORY).
“Although quantifying the quality of in-
dividual scientists is difficult, the general
view is that it is better to publish more
than less and that the citation count of a
paper (relative to citation habits in the
field) is a useful measure of it quality”
(Lehman, Jackson and Lautrup 2006,
page 1003).
“Citation frequency reflects a journal’s val-
ue and the use made of it. . . ”
“When a physician or a biomedical re-
searcher cites a journal article, it indicates
that the cited journal has influenced him
or her in some manner” (Garfield, 1987,
page 7).
“Citations are an acknowledgement of in-
tellectual debt” (THOMSON: FIFTY YEARS).
The relevant terms are “quality,” “value,” “influ-
ence” and “intellectual debt.” The term “impact”
has become the generic word used to assign meaning
to citations—a term that first arose in a short paper
written in 1955 by Eugene Garfield to promote the
idea of creating a citation index. He wrote:
“Thus, in the case of a highly significant
article, the citation index has a quantita-
tive value, for it may help the historian to
measure the influence of the article—that
is, its ‘impact factor’ ” (Garfield, 1955, page 3).
It is fairly clear that here, as elsewhere, the term
“impact factor” is intended to suggest that the citing
paper has been “built upon” the work of the cited—
that citations are the mechanism by which research
propagates itself forward.
There is a rich literature about the actual meaning
of citations that suggests citations are more compli-
cated than these vague statements lead us to be-
lieve. For example, in their 1983 paper on assessing
research, Martin and Irvine write:
“Underlying all these problems with the
use of citations as a measure of quality is
our ignorance of the reasons why authors
cite particular pieces of work and not oth-
ers. The problems described above. . . Simple
citation analysis presupposes a highly ra-
tional model of reference-giving, in which
citations are held to reflect primarily sci-
entific appreciation of previous work of
high quality or importance, and poten-
tial citers all have the same chance to cite
particular papers. . . ” (Martin and Irvine,
1983, page 69).
In her 1988 paper on the meaning of citations
(Cozzens, 1989), Cozzens asserts that citations are
the result of two systems underlying the conduct
of scientific publication, one a “reward” system and
the other “rhetorical.” The first kind have the mean-
ing most often associated with a citation—an ac-
knowledgment that the citing paper has “intellec-
tual debt” to the cited. The second, however, have
a meaning quite different—a reference to a previ-
ous paper that explains some result, perhaps not
a result of the cited author at all. Such rhetori-
cal citations are merely a way to carry on a scien-
tific conversation, not establish intellectual indebt-
edness. Of course, in some cases, a citation can have
both meanings.
The meaning of citations is not simple and
citation-based statistics are not nearly as “objec-
tive” as proponents assert.
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Cozzens makes the observation that most cita-
tions are rhetorical. This is confirmed by the ex-
perience of most practicing mathematicians. (In the
Math Reviews citations database, for example, nearly
30% of the more than 3 million citations are to books
and not to research articles in journals.) Why is
this important? Because unlike “reward” citations,
which tend to refer to seminal papers, the choice of
which paper to cite rhetorically depends on many
factors—the prestige of the cited author (the “halo”
effect), the relationship of the citing and cited au-
thors, the availability of the journal (Are open access
journals more likely to be cited?), the convenience of
referencing several results from a single paper, and
so forth. Few of these factors are directly related to
the “quality” of the cited paper.
Even when citations are “reward” citations, they
can reflect a variety of motives, including “currency,
negative credit, operational Information, persuasive-
ness, positive credit, reader alert, and social consen-
sus” (Brooks, 1986). In most cases, citations were
motivated by more than one of these. Some notable
results can suffer the “obliteration” effect, immedi-
ately being incorporated into the work of others,
which then serves as the basis for further citations.
Other citations are not rewards for outstanding re-
search, but rather warnings about flawed results or
thinking. The present report provides many exam-
ples of such “warning” citations.
The sociology of citations is a complex subject—
one that is beyond the scope of this report. Even this
cursory discussion, however, shows that the meaning
of citations is not simple and that citation-based
statistics are not nearly as “objective” as proponents
assert.
Some might argue that the meaning of citations
is immaterial because citation-based statistics are
highly correlated with some other measure of re-
search quality (such as peer review). For example,
the Evidence report mentioned earlier argues that
citation-statistics can (and should) replace other
forms of evaluation because of this correlation:
“Evidence has argued that bibliometric tech-
niques can create indicators of research
quality that are congruent with researcher
perception” (Evidence Report, 2007, page 9).
The conclusion seems to be that citation-based
statistics, regardless of their precise meaning, should
replace other methods of assessment, because they
often agree with them. Aside from the circularity of
this argument, the fallacy of such reasoning is easy
to see.
USING STATISTICS WISELY
The zealous over-reliance on objective metrics (statis-
tics) to assess research is neither a new nor an iso-
lated phenomenon. It is eloquently described in the
2001 popular book, Damned lies and statistics, writ-
ten by the sociologist Joel Best:
“There are cultures in which people be-
lieve that some objects have magical pow-
ers; anthropologists call these objects fetishes.
In our society, statistics are a sort of fetish.
We tend to regard statistics as though they
are magical, as though they are more than
mere numbers. We treat them as power-
ful representations of the truth; we act
as though they distill the complexity and
confusion of reality into simple facts. We
use statistics to convert complicated so-
cial problems into more easily understood
estimates, percentages, and rates. Statis-
tics direct our concern; they show us what
we ought to worry about and how much
we ought to worry. In a sense, the so-
cial problem becomes the statistic and,
because we treat statistics as true and in-
controvertible, they achieve a kind of fetish-
like, magical control over how we view so-
cial problems. We think of statistics as
facts that we discover, not numbers we
create” (Best, 2001, page 160).
This mystical belief in the magic of citation statis-
tics can be found throughout the documentation for
research assessment exercises, both national and in-
stitutional. It can also be found in the work of those
promoting the h-index and its variants.
This attitude is also evident in recent attempts to
improve on the impact factor using more sophisti-
cated mathematical algorithms, including page rank
algorithms, to analyze citations (Bergstrom, 2007;
Stringer et al., 2008). Their proponents make claims
about their efficacy that are unjustified by the anal-
ysis and difficult to assess. Because they are based
on more complicated calculations, the (often hid-
den) assumptions behind them are not easy for most
people to discern.7 We are meant to treat the num-
7The algorithm in (Bergstrom, 2007) uses a page rank al-
gorithm to give each citation a weight, and then computes an
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bers and rankings with awe—as truths rather than
creations.
Research is not the first publicly funded activity to
come under scrutiny, and over the past decades peo-
ple have tried to carry out quantitative performance
assessments of everything from educational systems
(schools) to healthcare (hospitals and even individ-
ual surgeons). In some cases, statisticians have stepped
in to advise those doing the measuring about sensi-
ble metrics and the proper use of statistics. If one
consults with doctors when practicing medicine, surely
one ought to consult with (and heed the advice of)
statisticians when practicing statistics. Two excel-
lent examples can be found in (Bird et al., 2005)
and (Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 1996). While they
each deal with performance assessment of things
other than research—public sector performance mon-
itoring in the first and healthcare/education in the
second—each provides insight about the sensible use
of statistics in assessing research.
If one consults with doctors when practicing
medicine, surely one ought to consult with statis-
ticians when practicing statistics.
The paper by Goldstein and Spiegelhalter in par-
ticular deals with the use of League Tables (rank-
ings) based on simple numbers (e.g., student achieve-
ments or medical outcomes), and it is particularly
relevant to assessing research by ranking journals,
papers, or authors using citation statistics. In their
paper, the authors outline a three-part framework
for any performance assessment:
“impact factor” by using the weighted averages for citations.
Page rank algorithms have merit because they take into ac-
count the “value” of citations. On the other hand, their com-
plexity can be dangerous because the final results are harder
to understand. In this case, all “self-citations” are discarded—
that is, all citations from articles in a given journal J to ar-
ticles published in J during the preceding five years are dis-
carded. These are not “self-citations” in any normal sense of
the word, and a glance at some data from the Math Reviews
Citations database suggests that this discards roughly one-
third of all citations.
The algorithm in (Stringer et al., 2008) is interesting, in
part because it attempts to address the differing time-scales
for citations as well as the issue of comparing randomly se-
lected papers in one journal with those from another. Again,
the complexity of the algorithms makes it hard for most peo-
ple to evaluate their results. One notable hypothesis is slipped
into the paper on page 2: “Our first assumption is that the
papers published in journal J have a normal distribution of
‘quality’. . . ” This seems to contradict common experience.
Data
“No amount of fancy statistical footwork
will overcome basic inadequacies in either
the appropriateness or the integrity of the
data collected” (Goldstein and Spiegelhal-
ter, 1996, page 389).
This is an important observation for citation-based
performance assessment. The impact factor, for ex-
ample, is based on a subset of data, which includes
only those journals selected by Thomson Scientific.
(We note that the impact factor itself is the ma-
jor part of the selection criterion.) Some have ques-
tioned the integrity of this data (Rossner, Van Epps
and Hill, 2007). Others point out that other data
sets might be more complete (Meho and Yang, 2007).
Several groups have pushed the idea of using Google
Scholar to implement citation-based statistics, such
as the h-index, but the data contained in Google
Scholar is often inaccurate (since things like author
names are automatically extracted from web post-
ings). Citation statistics for individual scientists are
sometimes difficult to obtain because authors are
not uniquely identified, and in some settings and cer-
tain countries, this can be an enormous impediment
to assembling accurate citation data. The particu-
lar collection of data one uses for citation analysis is
frequently overlooked. One is likely to draw faulty
conclusions from statistics based on faulty data.
Statistical Analysis and Presentation
“We shall pay particular attention to the
specification of an appropriate statistical
model, the crucial importance of uncer-
tainty in the presentation of all results,
techniques for adjustment of outcomes for
confounding factors and finally the extent
to which any reliance may be placed on
explicit rankings” (Goldstein and Spiegel-
halter, 1996, page 390).
As we have written previously, in most cases in
which citation statistics are used to rank papers,
people, and programs, no specific model is specified
in advance. Instead, the data itself suggests a model,
which is often vague. A circular process seems to
rank objects higher because they are ranked higher
(in the database). There is frequently scant atten-
tion to uncertainty in any of these rankings, and
little analysis of how that uncertainty (e.g., annual
variations in the impact factor) would affect the
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rankings. Finally, confounding factors (e.g., the par-
ticular discipline, the type of articles a journal pub-
lishes, whether a particular scientist is an experi-
mentalist or theoretician) are frequently ignored in
such rankings, especially when carried out in na-
tional performance assessments.
Interpretation and Impact
“The comparisons discussed in this paper
are of great public interest, and this is clearly
an area where careful attention to limi-
tations is both vital and likely to be ig-
nored. Whether adjusted outcomes are in
any way valid measures of institutional
‘quality’ is one issue, while analysts should
also be aware of the potential effect of
the results in terms of future behavioural
changes by institutions and individuals seek-
ing to improve their subsequent ‘ranking’”
(Goldstein and Spiegelhalter, 1996, page 390).
The assessment of research is also of great public
interest. For an individual scientist, an assessment
can have profound and long-term effects on one’s ca-
reer; for a department, it can change prospects for
success far into the future; for disciplines, a collec-
tion of assessments can make the difference between
thriving and languishing. For a task so important,
surely one should understand both the validity and
the limitations of the tools being used to carry it
out. To what extent do citations measure the quality
of research? Citation counts seem to be correlated
with quality, and there is an intuitive understand-
ing that high-quality articles are highly-cited. But as
explained above, some articles, especially in some
disciplines, are highly-cited for reasons other than
high quality, and it does not follow that highly-cited
articles are necessarily high quality. The precise in-
terpretation of rankings based on citation statistics
needs to be better understood. In addition, if cita-
tion statistics play a central role in research assess-
ment, it is clear that authors, editors and even pub-
lishers will find ways to manipulate the system to
their advantage (Macdonald and Kam, 2007). The
long-term implications of this are unclear and un-
studied.
The article by Goldstein and Spiegelhalter is valu-
able to read today because it makes clear that the
over-reliance on simple-minded statistics in research
assessment is not an isolated problem. Governments,
institutions, and individuals have struggled with sim-
ilar problems in the past in other contexts, and they
have found ways to better understand the statisti-
cal tools and to augment them with other means of
assessment. Goldstein and Spiegelhalter end their
paper with a positive statement of hope:
“Finally, although we have been generally
critical of many current attempts to pro-
vide judgments about institutions, we do
not wish to give the impression that we
believe that all such comparisons are nec-
essarily flawed. It seems to us that the
comparison of institutions and the attempt
to understand why institutions differ is an
extremely important activity and is best
carried out in a spirit of collaboration rather
than confrontation. It is perhaps the only
sure method for obtaining objectively based
information which can lead to understand-
ing and ultimately result in improvements.
The real problem with the simplistic proce-
dures which we have set out to criticize is
that they distract both attention and re-
sources from this worthier aim” (Gold-
stein and Spiegelhalter, 1996, page 406).
It would be hard to find a better statement to
express the goals that should be shared by everyone
involved in the assessment of research.
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